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Note
How Charitable Is the Sherman Act?
Tara Norgard*
Charity is a valued component of American life.1 In recog-
nition of that value, the government encourages charitable ac-
tivity by extending special privileges under the law to charita-
ble organizations 2 and allowing taxpayers to deduct charitable
gifts from their taxes each year.3 These policies have contrib-
uted to growth in the charitable sector. For example, in 1997
more than $143.5 billion was donated to a wide range of chari-
table organizations, a 7.5% increase over the previous year.4
Despite the legal privileges the charitable sector enjoys, it
is constrained by finite dollars to meet a seemingly infinite
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School.; B.A.
1993, Marquette University. I would like to thank Dean E. Thomas Sullivan
for his guidance and support.
1. Charitable organizations provide the majority of society's arts, more
than half of hospital care, one-fifth of colleges and universities, one-seventh of
secondary education, two-thirds of day care and a large part of vocational
training and family counseling. See David C. Hammack & Dennis R. Young,
Perspectives on Nonprofits in the Marketplace, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
IN A MARKET ECONOMY 4-5 (David C. Hammack & Dennis R. Young eds.,
1993). In addition to their social value, charitable organizations are a vital
element of the modern economy. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Non-
profit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835 (1980). The government is particu-
larly indebted to charities because they perform functions that the govern-
ment would otherwise have to provide. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
FUND-RAISING § 1.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1996).
2. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 836-37 (summarizing federal laws
affording special treatment to nonprofit organizations).
3. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1) (1994) (allowing tax deduction for charitable
contributions).
4. See Giving USA 1998 Announces Charitable Giving Increased 7.5% in
1997 (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://aafrc.org/NEWS.HTM> (totaling donations
to religious, educational, health, human services, arts/humanities, pub-
lic/social benefit and environmental organizations). Giving USA concludes
that recent growth in the charitable sector has been driven primarily by
households that file itemized tax returns, although giving from each of the
four major categories of donors-individuals, bequests, foundations, and cor-
porations-increased in 1997. See id.
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charitable need.5 As a result, charities employ sophisticated
business techniques to compete effectively for the dollars that
are available in the charitable marketplace. 6 When charities
behave like businesses they must operate according to the
same laws that constrain traditional businesses2 For instance,
when charities act in their business capacities they are subject
to the Sherman Act, which prohibits unreasonable restraints of
trade and monopolistic conduct. 8 However, it is not always ap-
parent when a charity is acting like a business such that it is
subject to the antitrust laws. In particular, it is not clear
whether charitable fundraising constitutes "trade or com-
merce" under the Sherman Act.
In Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals v. Humane
Society of the United States,9 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
5. See infra note 57 (discussing the finite common giving pool in the
charitable market).
6. See infra notes 59-61 (discussing the modern technology and business
techniques employed in charitable findraising).
7. See, e.g., NCAAv. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
120 (1984) (finding nonprofit defendant subject to Sherman Act). There is
also a body of state and federal law that pertains directly to the charitable
sector. At the state level, charitable solicitation statutes are the primary legal
means for regulating charities. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 3 (pro-
viding a comprehensive overview of state laws regulating charities). By virtue
of their police power, states enjoy wide latitude to regulate the charitable sec-
tor and state attorneys general perform the primary watchdog function. See
National Center for Nonprofit Boards, What You Should Know About Non-
profits, (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.ncnb.org/what-you~should/know_
. .fits/html/body-monitoringnonprofits.html> (discussing how nonprofits are
governed and monitored). However, the Supreme Court has said that a state
cannot limit the amount a charity can spend on fundraising. See Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-39 (1980) (find-
ing that state statutes that limit fundraising expenditures violate the First
Amendment).
At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax ex-
emptions to charities and the entities that contribute to them, also exerts sig-
nificant control on the charitable sector. See National Center for Nonprofit
Boards, supra (discussing how the Internal Revenue Service monitors tax-
exempt organizations). Other bodies that regulate charities include boards of
directors and private watchdog groups. See id.
8. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combina-
tion.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 2
condemns [elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce." Id. § 2. The Sherman Act is based on the theory
that ultimately competition will produce lower prices and better goods and
services. See National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
695 (1978).
9. 50 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 1995).
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"[ilf statutory language is to be given even a modicum of
meaning the solicitation of contributions by a nonprofit organi-
zation is not trade or commerce, and the Sherman Act has no
application to such activity."10 The DELTA court's holding has
been called "cutting-edge jurisprudence [that] raises some in-
teresting arguments for those counseling nonprofit organiza-
tions concerning avoidance of antitrust liability."11 Presuma-
bly, a fundraising exemption creates a loophole through which
adroit nonprofits may escape liability under the antitrust
laws. 12 Notably, since the Ninth Circuit proclaimed this im-
munity no other federal court has explicitly endorsed the view
that soliciting charitable gifts is automatically exempt from
Sherman Act jurisdiction.1 3
10. Id. at 712.
11. William E. Walters, Antitrust and the Nonprofit Environment: Doing
Good Without Doing Time, 25 COLO. LAW. 51, 52 (1996).
12. Some charitable organizations currently escape taxation of unrelated
activities by portraying those activities as "fundraising." See HOPKINS, supra
note 1, § 6.6(b), at 462-78 (discussing unrelated income rules under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code). It is not unreasonable to assume that unscrupulous or-
ganizations would attempt to exploit a fundraising exemption to the antitrust
laws. Parties have tried to exploit similar loopholes in the past. For instance,
it was historically believed, although never authoritatively held, that the pro-
fessions did not engage in "trade or commerce" under the Sherman Act. See
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975) (discussing the "clas-
sie argument traditionally advanced to distinguish professions from trades,
businesses and other occupations and ultimately rejecting that argument);
WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, A DIcTIONARY OF LAW 1043 (1889) (defining "trade" as
an activity carried on for profit, "distinguished from the liberal arts and
learned professions, and from agriculture") (citing Whitcomb v. Reid, 31 Miss.
569 (1856)). The Supreme Court has since closed that potential loophole. See
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 (finding that Congress did not intend a sweeping
exclusion of the professions from the Sherman Act).
In addition to creating an opportunity for organizations to elude antitrust
scrutiny, the holding in DELTA may chill legitimate antitrust litigation. Par-
ties in federal court must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
mandate that claims must be warranted by existing law, or at least a good
faith argument for the extension or reversal thereof. See FED. R. CIV. P.
11(b)(2). If the settled law of the circuit is that charitable fundraising is not
commercial behavior, parties that bring claims alleging anticompetitive be-
havior in that context may be subject to sanction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)
(providing for sanctions where Rule 11 has been violated).
13. Nevertheless, charities are not subject to the Sherman Act in every
instance. For example, Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction is limited to
entities "organized to carry on business for [their] own profit or that of [their]
members." Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1994).
What constitutes "profit" under the FTC Act is currently under review by the
Supreme Court. See FTC's Invalidation of Dental Association's Advertising
Rules Is Focus of Oral Argument, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1999] 1517
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Only one circuit court has cited DELTA for its holding that
fundraising is not trade or commerce. In Virginia Vermiculite
v. W.R. Grace & Co., the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
DELTA court interpreted "trade or commerce" to the exclusion
of charitable fundraising, but declined to make a similar blan-
ket exemption for charitable donations. 14 Unlike the DELTA
court, the court in Virginia Vermiculite refused to interpret the
statute apart from the behavior at issue in the case. 15 Rather,
the Fourth Circuit first examined evidence of the alleged anti-
competitive charitable donation to determine whether it consti-
tuted trade or commerce. 16 The facts of the case led the court
to conclude that the transaction was commercial and, upon fur-
ther analysis, was an anticompetitive act in violation of the
Sherman Act.17
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to exempt a charitable gift
from the purview of the Sherman Act is consistent with anti-
trust jurisprudence that recognizes commercial conduct in the
charitable sector and calls for careful scrutiny of an organiza-
tion's behavior to determine whether antitrust review is ap-
propriate. 18 Blanket immunity is a rare exception, not the
rule.19 To be exempt from the antitrust laws an activity must
1892, at 5 (Jan. 14, 1999) (reporting that the definition of profit under the
FTC Act was a focal point of oral arguments before the Supreme Court in
California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Sup. Ct.,
No. 97-1625, argued, Jan. 13, 1999). At least one court has determined that
charitable fundraising may affect commerce such that the FTC has jurisdic-
tion under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Saja, No. Civ-
97-0666-PHX-SMM, 1997 WL 703399, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 1997) (finding
that the defendant's fraudulent fundraising scheme affected commerce such
that FTC jurisdiction under the FTC Act was appropriate). Outside the realm
of antitrust, however, the result may be different. For instance, the Supreme
Court has found that charitable fundraising is fully protected speech, rather
than commercial speech, which is subject to a more deferential standard of
review. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 787-95 (1988).
14. 156 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, No. 98-1289
(Feb. 10, 1999).
15. See infra Part IE.B (discussing the Fourth Circuit opinion in Virginia
Vermiculite).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis
courts undertake to determine whether the Sherman Act applies).
19. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing courts' general
reluctance to grant exemptions from the Sherman Act); infra note 37 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Supreme Court's explicit refusal to automati-
cally exempt nonprofits from antitrust review); infra Part IV.C (discussing
limited areas where judicially created exemptions have been recognized).
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meet stringent standards. 20 By creating an immunity instead
of examining the specific conduct before it, the DELTA court
set a dangerous precedent, ripe for disingenuous organizations
to manipulate to their advantage.
This Note explores whether and how the federal antitrust
laws21 apply to charitable organizations' fundraising activi-
ties.22 Part I provides an overview of the Sherman Act. Part H
discusses "trade or commerce" as defined by the Sherman Act
and how commercial dynamics play out in the charitable sec-
tor. Part IU discusses the Ninth Circuit's decision in DELTA
and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Virginia Vermiculite. Fi-
nally, Part IV argues that the Ninth Circuit was shortsighted
in exempting charitable activity from the Sherman Act and
20. See infra Part IV.C (discussing judicially created exemptions from the
Sherman Act).
21. For purposes of this Note, "antitrust laws" are sections one and two of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
22. For purposes of this Note, "charitable organizations" are those that
are tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)(1994) (listing organizations operated "exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to fos-
ter national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals"). To qualify for federal in-
come tax exemption the organization must have a specified public, rather
than private, purpose. However, no law mandates that charitable nonprofits
serve the indigent, prohibits them from engaging in business activities, or
limits the salaries they pay to staff and directors. See Evelyn Brody, Institu-
tional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433, 478 (1996).
This Note will use the terms "charitable" and "nonprofit" interchangeably to
refer to these organizations, although charities are generally considered a
subset of the larger group of nonprofit institutions. See Boris I. Bittker &
George KF Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 330-57 (1976) (distinguishing among dif-
ferent types of nonprofits, particularly as treated by the federal tax code); see
also HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 21-24 (discussing the scope of the term
"charitable organization"). Charities share the same general characteristics of
nonprofits. For instance, both charities and nonprofits can and do earn profits
but neither can distribute profits to their members, officers, shareholders or
owners. See ELAINE M. HADDEN & BLAIRE A. FRENCH, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 9 (1987) (explaining that the difference between nonprofit
and for-profit organizations is not whether they may earn profits, but rather
who may receive those profits). Accordingly, a religious organization that
generates income from a bake sale maintains its tax-exempt charitable status
as long as the income is exclusively devoted to the purpose of the organization
and is not disbursed to the organization's members or shareholders. See
Community Blood Bank v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1011, 1019-20
(8th Cir. 1969) (using this example to describe the distinction between for-
profit and nonprofit firms).
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that the Fourth Circuit took the more prudent analytical path
in examining the intersection between the specific charitable
activity before it and the principles embodied in the Act.
Charitable fundraising is inherently commercial.23 Ac-
cordingly, the antitrust laws should apply to fundraising ac-
tivities.24 Application of the Sherman Act to charitable fund-
raising is not only mandated by law, it is good policy. Antitrust
principles of efficiency, minimum production cost, innovation,
equal market access and fair distribution are as desirable in
the charitable marketplace as they are in a traditional busi-
ness setting.2 5
I. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
The Sherman Act promotes competition among businesses.
2 6
Rather than restrict the Act's jurisdiction to an exclusive list of
23. See infra Part 1.C (discussing the commercial nature of charitable
fundraising).
24. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing courts' applica-
tion of antitrust laws to commercial activities undertaken by nonprofit or-
ganizations).
25. See Dedication & Everlasting Love to Animals v. Humane Soc'y of the
United States, 50 F.3d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging the impor-
tance of these principles in the nonprofit sector).
26. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940) (exam-
ining extensive legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluding that
competition was its aim and that the Act was designed to prevent restraints
on such competition); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE
FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS, at vii (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991) ("The first
principle of antitrust is that our economic system should operate through
market forces and that American markets should be competitive."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) ("The goal of
antitrust is to perfect the operation of competitive markets."). Antitrust law
is based on the premise that through competition, producers will strive to
satisfy the consumer's wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the few-
est resources. See Theodore J. Stachtiaris, Note, Antitrust in Need: Under-
graduate Financial Aid and United States v. Brown University, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1745, 1766 (1994).
There is a question among courts and scholars whether competitive ends
are appropriate in a nonprofit context. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 122 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) ("By miti-
gating what appears to be a clear failure of the free market to serve the ends
and goals of higher education, the NCAA ensures the continued availability of
a unique and valuable product" that otherwise might not be available); Nolan
Koon, United States v. Brown University and a New Proposal to Discern
Whether Certain Financial Aid Constitutes "Trade or Commerce", 22 J.C. &
U.L. 191, 200 (1995) (arguing that while antitrust analysis is a "science
premised upon economic models and theory," economic predictions are not ap-
propriate for every situation); Richard Bartlett, Note, United Charities and
[Vol. 83:15151520
19991 SHERMANACT 1521
activities, Congress wrote the law in broad strokes, without de-
fining the specific parameters of the competitive principles it
espouses.27 As a result, courts are to interpret the Act "in the
light of its legislative history and of the particular evils at
which the legislation was aimed."28 By affording such latitude,
Congress also created a debate as to how the courts should ap-
ply the Act to achieve its competitive end. The predominant
view is that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to maximize
consumer welfare and increase economic efficiency without
consideration of other social goals.29 A minority view is that
competition under the antitrust laws should promote various
social welfare goals in addition to economic ideals.30 Either
the Sherman Act, 91 YALE L.J. 1593, 1597 (1982) (arguing that rules of struc-
ture and conduct developed in a for-profit setting may not be appropriate in
the charitable sector due to institutional differences between the two); Sri-
kanth Srinivasan, Note, College Financial Aid and Antitrust: Applying the
Sherman Act to Collaborative Nonprofit Activity, 46 STAN. L. REV. 919, 928-29(1994) (noting that while antitrust laws are based on models of perfectly-
functioning markets, nonprofits appear where market failures occur). But see
National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978)(rejecting the argument that the particular characteristics of an industry
might make competition undesirable and therefore outside the purview of the
antitrust laws).
27. See National Soc'y of Profil Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 678 (finding that Con-
gress "did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full mean-
ing of the statute or its application in concrete situations"); Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (finding that "Congress intended to
strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of the Sherman Act," and that reading
broad exemptions into the Act would be contrary to its purpose); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (stating
that "[1language more comprehensive is difficult to conceive," and concluding
that Congress intended to bring every anticompetitive business activity
within the scope of the Act).
28. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,489 (1940).
29. This view is most famously attributed to Judge Bork. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX ch. 2 (1978); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 20 (1976) (concluding that al-
though noneconomic goals are mentioned in the legislative history of the anti-
trust laws, Congress's dominant intent was to promote economic principles of
competition and maximum efficiency); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a
Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 714-17 (1982) (arguing that
the Supreme Court is wrong where it sacrifices economic efficiency to other
goals). According to those who subscribe to this school of thought, social, po-
litical or other nonefficiency criteria are not applicable to the antitrust analy-
sis. See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69 (1982). Rather, the only legitimate analysis evaluates
the activity's effect on competition. See id. The Supreme Court has explicitly
endorsed this view. See National Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691.
30. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
way, the Act assumes that judicial review is necessary when-
ever parties have a financial interest in restraining competi-
tion.31
In order for a Sherman Act claim to stand, the activity in
question must constitute "trade or commerce" as defined by the
Act 32 and must not be otherwise immune from the purview of
the federal antitrust laws.33 Although judicially created ex-
ANTITRUST § 2, at 10-13 (1977) (arguing that antitrust is a system of law, not
a system of economics, which rightfully has noneconomic objectives); Kenneth
G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1194-1203 (1977) (arguing that
goals of antitrust include redistribution of income, promotion of small enter-
prises, freedom for entrepreneurs and neutral treatment of minorities);
Lande, supra note 29, at 96-105 (describing the 51st Congress's desire to curb
the social and political power of trusts and monopolies and protect business
opportunities for small firms).
3L See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 667, 697 (1991) (concluding that the legislative history of the Sherman
Act supports the requirement of judicial review for financially interested par-
ties). This bolsters the position that careful antitrust review of a nonprofit's
activities is appropriate, since nonprofits can and do earn profits. See supra
note 22 (discussing how a nonprofit may earn profits but is precluded from
distributing those profits to its members, officers, shareholders or owners).
Moreover, even though a charity cannot distribute profits to certain parties,
that restriction is no guarantee that the organization will act in the best in-
terests of those for whom it is organized. See PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 232.2, at 275 (Supp. 1991); see also Bartlett,
supra note 26, at 1601 n.37 (arguing that just as a for-profit monopolist can
raise its prices to increase profits, a monopolist charity can vary the nature of
the goods and services it provides to the advantage of those who control the
organization).
32 See, e.g., Dedication & Everlasting Love to Animals v. Humane Soc'y
of the United States, 50 F.3d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that solicitation
of contributions by a nonprofit organization is not "trade or commerce" and is
therefore not subject to the Sherman Act); Marjorie Webster Junior College v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schs., 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (concluding that educational regulation is noncommercial activity
beyond the scope of the Sherman Act). But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 786-88 (1975) (finding the sale of professional services to be
"trade or commerce" and subject to the antitrust laws).
33. Although the text of the Sherman Act does not provide for any explicit
exemptions, the courts have immunized certain conduct that otherwise might
be challenged under the antitrust laws. For instance, states are immune from
antitrust liability. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (estab-
lishing "state action" immunity). The state action immunity doctrine that
originated in Parker is based on principles of federalism. See DANIEL R.
MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW § 11.02, at 11-3 (1998). The im-
munity reflects a "compromise between the judiciary's obligation to respect
the results of the democratic process at the state level and its obligation to
respect that same process at the national level." Merrick B. Garland, Anti-
trust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE
[Vol. 83:15151522
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emptions are recognized, there is a strong presumption against
implied immunity from Sherman Act scrutiny.34 Moreover,
even where an activity is otherwise noncommercial, it can be
subject to antitrust review if it is undertaken with a commer-
cial purpose 3s or with the knowledge that it would have anti-
L.J. 486, 501 (1986). Municipalities that act on a clearly and afratively ex-
pressed mandate from the state are also immune. See Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38-39 (1985) (finding that municipal conduct un-
dertaken pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy with the foreseeable re-
sult of displacing competition is immune from federal antitrust liability). Mu-
nicipalities do not enjoy the same automatic exemption as states because
"[cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal def-
erence of the States that create them." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
Another source of immunity is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which pro-
vides that pursuing litigation or seeking other governmental action against a
competitor is normally a protected activity. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 875
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Noerr-
Pennington exemption is premised on the constitutional theory that the First
Amendment protects the right to assemble and petition the government. See
MANDELKER ET AL., supra, § 13.06[11], at 13-39. This exemption is not abso-
lute, however, and may be invalid if the petitioning involves fraudulent ac-
tions, "sham" litigation, commercial dealing, private standard-setting or situa-
tions in which the government being petitioned is acting in a commercial
capacity. See id. § 13.06[1] [bl-[e].
Another exemption is found where the antitrust laws intersect with the
National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (1994). Under this
statute, anticompetitive labor-management activities are subject to review by
the National Labor Relations Board rather than the federal judiciary. See
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 518 U.S.
231 (1996) (finding agreement among owners of professional football teams to
cap players' salaries exempt from antitrust laws). The exemption reconciles
federal antitrust and labor policies based on the principle that lawful re-
straints of competition imposed through the bargaining process are exempt
from the antitrust laws as long as the restraints are limited to the labor mar-
ket organized around the collective bargaining relationship. See id.
34. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) ("[Olur
cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption against
implicit exemptions.") (citations omitted).
35. See Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Col-
leges and Secondary Schs., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that
antitrust laws would apply to the act of accreditation if there were a commer-
cial motive for the action). But the opposite is not true. A noncommercial mo-
tive will not spare an otherwise commercial activity from antitrust review.
See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787-88 (finding that while nonprofits engaged in
noncommercial activity may escape liability under the antitrust laws, the im-
munity is narrowly circumscribed and does not extend to commercial transac-
tions with a "public-service aspect"); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d
658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging the defendant's promotion of congres-
sionally recognized social goals, but finding that social welfare justifications
did not remove its conduct from the realm of trade or commerce).
1999] 1523
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competitive effects.36 Notably, the Supreme Court explicitly
has refused to provide blanket immunity to charitable organi-
zations by virtue of their nonprofit status.37 The legislative
history of the Sherman Act reveals that Congress did consider
granting an exemption for nonprofit actors, but such an exemp-
tion was never enacted into law. 38 Nevertheless, the courts
36. See Virginia Vermiculite v. W.R. Grace & Co., 156 F.3d 535, 541 (4th
Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, No. 98-1289 (Feb. 10, 1999) (finding that an
organization that would otherwise be exempt from the antitrust law loses its
exemption by acquiescing to a conspiring party's conduct with the knowledge
that it would have anticompetitive effects).
37. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) ("There is no doubt that the
sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit entities... and in the past we
have imposed antitrust liability on nonprofit entities which have engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.") (citations omitted); American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982) ("lilt is beyond de-
bate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable under the antitrust
laws."). In denying such an exemption the Court has recognized that an ac-
tivity may be characterized as both socially useful and as business at the same
time. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787-89 (finding that "whatever else it may be,"
the exchange of professional services for money is commercial activity) (em-
phasis added and citations omitted).
A textual analysis of the Sherman Act provides three reasons supporting
the conclusion that nonprofits are not exempt. First, there is no mention of
such an exemption anywhere in the Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994). Second,
the language of the act is comprehensive, as opposed to restrictive. See infra
Part I.A (discussing Congress's drafting of the Sherman Act in broad terms,
so as to encompass the widest range of anticompetitive activities). Third,
while the Sherman Act makes certain conduct illegal, it does not address the
lawfulness of certain entities or structures apart from their conduct. See
Koon, supra note 26, at 199 (highlighting the distinction between entities and
their conduct under the Sherman Act).
Extra-textual support for the non-exemption of nonprofits exists as well.
For instance, it is generally recognized that charities can and do operate in a
commercial capacity. See infra notes 65-66. Charities are also a major com-
ponent of the American economy. See supra note 1. If this large portion of
commerce is to be extracted from the purview of the antitrust laws, it should
be done by Congress, not by judicial fiat. See e.g., National Soc'y of Profl
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (stating that the courts' role
is limited to determining the competitive impact of an activity and suggesting
that Congress must make larger policy decisions about whether antitrust
principles are properly applied in a particular industry). Indeed, Congress
has made such policy decisions in the past. See, e.g., Charitable Donation An-
titrust Immunity Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-26, 111 Stat. 241 (1997) (immu-
nizing "donations made in the form of charitable gift annuities and charitable
remainder trusts from the antitrust laws").
38. See 1 THE LEGISLATivE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES 251-52 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978). When asked
whether the Sherman Act would apply to temperance societies, Senator
Sherman responded, "I do not see any reason for putting in temperance socie-
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have been reluctant to condemn a nonprofit under the Act for
conduct that promotes the public interest.39
Since charitable organizations are not automatically ex-
empt from the Sherman Act, the threshold question is whether
the activity in question constitutes "trade or commerce." 40 If
the court determines that no trade or commerce is at issue, the
analysis ends. If, however, a charitable activity implicates
trade or commerce, the court must further examine whether
that behavior violates the antitrust laws.41
ties any more than churches or school-houses or any other kind of moral or
educational associations that may be organized. Such an association is not in
any sense a combination or arrangement made to interfere with interstate
commerce .... " Id. at 252. The Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the
authoritative value of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. See Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940). Despite its endorsement of
the legislative history, the Supreme Court has indicated that a determination
of what constitutes trade or commerce must also be informed by the current
social context. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 (finding that "filn the modern
world, it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important
part in commercial intercourse," and that lawyers' anticompetitive conduct
might restrain commerce) (emphasis added). It is not uncommon for federal
statutes to evolve by taking the current context into consideration. For ex-
ample, the federal tax code has been amended over the years to extend the tax
exemption to new areas where nonprofits have developed. See Hansmann,
supra note 1, at 882.
39. Some courts have avoided imposing the Sherman Act on nonprofits by
factoring social welfare goals into the antitrust analysis. See, e.g., United
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding for further
consideration of nonprofit defendant's noneconomic and procompetitive justi-
fications for alleged anticompetitive activity). Other courts have found that
application of the antitrust laws to nonprofits is not appropriate where the
conduct at issue is noncommercial. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College
v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schs., 432 F.2d 650, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding that accreditation activities of nonprofit organization
are not commercial activity).
40. See Peter James Kolovos, Note, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organi-
zations: The Law School Accreditation Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 711 (1996)
("A threshold question in any antitrust case is whether the challenged activity
amounts to 'trade or commerce' and thus falls within the jurisdictional reach
of the Sherman Act.").
41. Once it is determined that antitrust laws apply, the court proceeds
with one of three levels of analysis for a claim brought under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. First, the court will condemn an activity as per se illegal when
the activity appears to always or almost always restrict competition and de-
crease output. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). If an activity is not illegal per se, the court will apply a
"quick look" rule of reason analysis. This is an intermediate standard that
applies where competitive harm is presumed, but allows the defendant to re-
but the presumption with competitive justifications for the restraint. See Lee
Goldman, The Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The
Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications Under Sec-
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II. "TRADE OR COMMERCE" IN ANTITRUST THEORY
AND CHARITABLE PRACTICE
A. "TRADE OR COMMERCE" UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns every "contract,
combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."42 Section
2 prohibits monopolizing, attempting to monopolize or con-
spiring to monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States."43 According to the legislative his-
tory of the Act, the 51st Congress considered it impracticable to
enumerate every activity within the meaning and purpose of
the words "trade" and "commerce" and thought that the inter-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE L. & POLY REV. 137, 141 (1995). If the re-
straint is clearly harmful with little benefit, a "quick look" allows the court to
condemn the act without protracted litigation. See id. It also gives the courts
flexibility to consider the defendant's justifications for the restraint and up-
hold conduct that is harmless to competition. See id. If the defendant pro-
vides a viable justification, the court will then apply the full-scale "rule of rea-
son" analysis and consider the "history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end
sought to be attained." Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918). While the rule of reason considers the surrounding circumstances of
and rationales for a particular activity, it is unclear whether noneconomic jus-
tifications are properly factored into the equation. Compare National Soc'y of
Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978) (rejecting defen-
dants' public safety justification on grounds that the Rule of Reason is limited
to an activity's impact on competition, and finding that any argument based
on noneconomic justifications should be addressed to Congress), with Gold-
farb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17 (1975) ("The public service aspect, and other fea-
tures of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently."). The question whether noneconomic justifications are
acceptable is particularly relevant in the charitable setting where antitrust
conduct is alleged, as such justifications may allow a charity to escape anti-
trust liability. See supra note 39.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Restraints of trade that are either "in" inter-
state commerce or have a substantial "effect" on interstate commerce are in-
cluded under the Sherman Act. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948). The effect is that federal
antitrust laws can reach activities at the local level as long as there is a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. See MANDELKER ETAL., supra note 33,
§ 13.0413], at 13-25.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Unlawful monopoly is "distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or his-
toric accident." United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). In
other words, the mere possession of monopoly power is not illegal. See Tho-
mas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 288 (1986).
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pretation of these terms was better left to the judiciary." Ac-
cordingly, whether a transaction is classified as commercial or
noncommercial depends on the nature of the act and the total-
ity of the surrounding circumstances.45
With no definitive authority controlling the parameters of
what constitutes trade or commercial conduct under the
Sherman Act, a variety of interpretive theories have emerged.
At one end of the spectrum is the argument that by using the
terms "trade or commerce" Congress intended the Act to cover
only traditional business firms, not charitable entities.46 A
more moderate approach places "pure charity" outside the
scope of the antitrust laws, which does not exempt nonprofit
institutions altogether, but does limit their liability.47 At the
44. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 n.10 (1940) (citing
Senator Edmunds, The Interstate Trust and Commerce Act of 1890, 194 N.
AM. REV. 801, 813 (1911)). Many argue that the courts are restricted in this
interpretative endeavor to the common law. See Arthur, supra note 43, at 279
n.64 (listing scholars who agree that the Sherman Act was intended to codify
common law). Dictionaries published around the time of the Sherman Act
provide insight into the common law definition of these terms. "Trade" was
not thought to encompass the liberal arts or the learned professions. See
ANDERSON, supra note 12 (discussing the common law definition of "trade).
The common law definition of "trade" also excluded the activities of local gov-
ernment entities. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 33, § 13.07[1], at 13-57.
"Commerce" was defined by common law as "an exchange of goods; but in the
advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care and various
mediums of exchange, become commodities and enter into commerce."
ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 198 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 229 (1824)).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993)(noting that courts classify a transaction as commercial or noncommercial in
light of these factors).
46. See Arthur, supra note 43, at 278. Arthur concludes that charities are
not covered by the antitrust laws because there is no mention of charitable
activities in the Act's legislative history or at common law. See id. at 278
n.62. Rather than treat the Sherman Act as "enabling" legislation that invites
the federal courts to learn how businesses and markets work and prescribe
rules that make them work in socially efficient ways, Arthur contends that
the scope of the Sherman Act should be limited "to the business restraints of
trade against which the Act was originally directed," and should not extend to
local governments or charitable institutions. Id. at 266, 271-72; see also
Stachtiaris, supra note 26, at 1760 ("The debates prior to the passing of the
Sherman Act confirm that the Act was not intended to reach the activities of
organizations embracing social causes.").
47. See, e.g., Brown, 5 F.3d at 665-66 (opining that "pure charity" is not
commerce). But see United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp.
1251, 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); E. THOMAS
SULLIAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 233 (4th ed. forthcoming 1999)
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other end of the spectrum is the proposition that some tradi-
tional charitable activities are "trade or commerce" and are
therefore subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction.48
B. "TRADE OR COMNERCE" IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR
While there is little debate that trade and commercial ac-
tivity takes place in traditional business settings, the issue is
less settled when it comes to the charitable sector. In the non-
profit context, the definition of "trade or commerce" is decided
on a case-by-case basis, which has produced varied results.
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that a nonprofit or-
ganized to regulate amateur athletics engages in commercial
activity where its television broadcasting plan constitutes hori-
zontal price fixing and imposes limitations on output.
49 Simi-
larly, the Third Circuit has found that an agreement among
nonprofit universities to share scholarship information is
within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act because
providing scholarships is commercial in nature and reflects the
business aspects of a university. 0 On the other hand, the D.C.
Circuit has found that a voluntary nonprofit educational corpo-
ration that accredits nonprofit colleges does not violate the
Sherman Act where there is only an incidental restraint of
trade and no commercial intent motivating the behavior.51
C. "TRADE OR COMMERCE" AND CHARITABLE FUNDRAISNG
Commercial dynamics permeate the charitable sector.52
Charities produce goods and services. 53 Individuals and other
(manuscript on file with the author) ("INlonprofits may seek monopoly profits
and cause competitive injury even when acting for purely charitable pur-
poses.").
48. See e.g., Virginia Vermiculite v. W.R. Grace & Co., 156 F.3d 535, 541
(4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, No. 98-1289, WL 554196, at *4-5 (Feb.
10, 1999) (finding that a donation to a charitable organization was "fundamen-
tally commercial," evidenced by the transaction's effect on the market and the
direct commercial benefits for the charity, its management and its members).
49. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-
100 (1984).
50. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 666-68.
51. See Maijorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Col-
leges and Secondary Schs., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (reasoning
that "an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect...
[commerce], is not sufficient to warrant application of the antitrust laws" and
acknowledging that if a commercial motive were present, "antitrust policy
would presumably be applicable").
52. See Brody, supra note 22, at 466 (noting that it is often difficult to ex-
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entities purchase charitable goods and services for their own
benefit and for the benefit of others.54 The "price" of a charita-
ble product is the amount of donative capital required to pro-
duce an additional unit of service.55
plain how a nonprofit organization behaves differently from a proprietary en-
terprise); Hammack & Young, supra note 1, at xix (noting that nonprofit
management programs adopt methods from the business sector, including
marketing, entrepreneurship and financial management techniques, in order
to compete in the new nonprofit market environment); Lester M. Salamon,
The Marketization of Welfare: Changing Nonprofit and For-Profit Roles in the
American Welfare State, 67 Soc. SERV. REV. 16, 16-17 (1993) (noting the
"striking" expansion of commercial activity by nonprofit organizations);
Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1596 n.22 (discussing commercial features of chari-
table solicitation).
53. The goods and services produced by charities range from food and
clothes for the poor, to education for various sectors of society, to counseling
for the mentally ill, to performing arts productions, museums and animal
shelters. Unlike for-profit firms, which produce goods and services at mar-
ginal cost, a charitable organization may produce at any level of output for
which its donations and investment income cover the average cost of produc-
tion. See Bartlett, supra note 26, app. at 1612.
54. The goods and services that are purchased from a charitable organi-
zation may be for the benefit of the public, rather than the individual who
pays for the charitable production. See Hammack & Young, supra note 1, at 2(describing how a donor may intend his or her contribution to provide services
for the benefit of others under arrangements that can be conceived of as
"markets"); Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1598 n.28 (describing how donations
may purchase a public good, such that the benefits are not limited to those
who pay for their production). On the other hand, charitable contributions
also benefit the donor. For instance, individuals who donate to charities are
eligible for income tax deductions. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1) (1994) (allowing
tax deduction for charitable contributions). The Internal Revenue Service has
even ruled that credit card holders may claim deductions for a credit card
company's payments to charitable organizations on their behalf. See Peter M.
Berkery, Jr., Card Holders May Deduct Charitable Contributions Made from
Rebates, ACCOUNTING TODAY, July 8, 1996, at 10. Corporations and other en-
tities also benefit from charitable giving because such gifts tend to engender
goodwill in the communities where they do business. For instance, Philip
Morris has a long history of generously funding the arts in New York City,
where it is headquartered. See Brody, supra note 22, at 468. Corporate dona-
tions may also be linked directly to a company's business goals. See Margaret
M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 27, 48-49 (1998) (identifying patterns of corporate giving that show that
companies have a vested interest in contributing to a healthy workforce and
therefore donate accordingly); Marianne Jennings & Craig Cantoni, An Un-
charitable Look at Corporate Philanthropy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1998, at A18(citing Ben & Jerry's as an example of a company that has made philanthropy
a central part of its marketing strategy); see also infra note 76 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the altruistic and self-benefiting elements of charitable
giving).
55. See Bartlett, supra note 26, app. at 1613 n.3. A charity that produces
additional goods and services with the same amount of donative capital does
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To be viable in the charitable marketplace, an organization
must garner support from donors who fund the production of
charitable goods and services.56 Since charities cannot function
without contributions, competition for donations is a matter of
institutional survival.57 The battle to raise charitable dollars
intensifies as the public grows increasingly reluctant to spend
tax dollars on social problems.5 8 To compete effectively for do-
nations, organizations employ sophisticated business methods
and fundraising techniques, including professional fundraisers
and modem technology.5 9 Today charitable fundraising is
so at a lower price. See id.
56. See Brody, supra note 22, at 467 (arguing that nonprofits must and do
compete for funds, labor, legitimacy and survival); Hammack & Young, supra
note 1, at 4 (explaining how a nonprofit needs support from customers, spon-
sors or donors who fund the production of charitable goods and services);
HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 24 ("Fund-raising is, in itself, a unique form of
communication that promotes' and 'sells' the product (cause) and 'asks for the
order' at the same time.").
57. See David D. Blaine et al., Survey of 1995 Nonprofit Case Law, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 125, 209 (1996) (noting that the life span and success of a non-
profit is determined by the amount of charitable gifts it collects). While chari-
ties espouse different causes and new sources of donations can be found,
charities are dependent on a common giving pool and must compete for con-
tributions from within that pool. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Qual-
ity of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 605, 654 (1991).
58. This trend was particularly acute during the Reagan and Bush eras,
although the effect still lingers where the rallying cry is for smarter and
smaller government, less welfare and more self-sufficiency. See Howard P.
Tuckman, How and Why Nonprofit Organizations in a Private Economy Ob-
tain Capital, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY, supra
note 1; Dana Milbank, U.S. Charities Fear They Will Be Overwhelmed, Not
Empowered, by Republican Welfare Cutbacks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1995, at
A24 (reporting that in response to Republican welfare cutbacks, charities es-
timated they would need giving to increase 247% by the year 2002).
59. Espinoza calls this dynamic the charitable "fund-raising mill," charac-
terized by hard-sell marketing, telephone and mail appeals. Espinoza, supra
note 57, at 609. As a result of this unbridled competitive fimdraising, chari-
ties must spend more and more of the money they collect to raise additional
funds. See id. In the past, there have been well-publicized instances in which
charities have raised millions of dollars but allocated only a small portion to
their charitable purpose. See, e.g., 'Helping Children', WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
1980, at Al (reporting on a Virginia charity that raised nearly $1 million for
its cause but allocated 93% of that total to management fees, administrative
costs, and fundraising); Liz Spayd, Marines' Toys for Tots Spent Millions on
Itself: Donations Used to Run Charity, Not Buy Gifts, WASH. POST, Oct. 2,
1995, at Al (reporting that that organization spent 10% of the money it raised
on toys for children with the balance going to management, fundraising and
promotional material); Carol Gentry, AIDS Charities Let Pros Run Major
Events, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 1, 1997, at NE 1 (noting that the AIDS Ride has
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geared to consumers, making it easier than ever for individuals
to donate. For instance, many charities solicit gifts paid by
credit card.60 A number of charities have also taken advantage
of electronic commerce by accepting donations over the Inter-
net.61 As charities develop new methods to attract gifts, "con-
sumerism" has emerged in the charitable marketplace. 62 Be-
sieged by solicitations for contributions, individual and
corporate patrons have become critical consumers, taking a
businesslike approach to spending their gift dollars. 63
The donations a charity collects not only fund its charita-
ble purpose, but also enable it to maintain its organizational
infrastructure.64 Like any business, a charity must participate
been criticized for hiring highly-paid fundraisers and delivering only fifty
cents on the dollar to actual services). Those who criticize the "big business"
of competing for the charitable dollar advocate regulation to minimize abuse,
protect donors from fraud, and reduce the waste of charitable donations. See
HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1, at 1. Others question whether such regulation
merely stifles the charitable marketplace. See id.
60. For instance, Teaching Tolerance, an organization that seeks to re-
duce prejudice in America, accepts gifts paid via VISA, MasterCard and
American Express. See letter from Teaching Tolerance, a nonprofit organiza-
tion, to potential donor (Oct. 15, 1998) (on file with author).
61. The Shelter, a charity that works on behalf of the homeless, is one of
many organizations that accept credit card donations over the Internet. See
<http://secure.mailnktg.com/echarity/shelter/donate.htm> (visited Jan. 5,
1999).
62. See HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 16-17 (describing the "consumer-
ism" movement in nonprofit charitable organizations).
63. See id. at 17 (noting that donors are demonstrating a greater procliv-
ity to inquire about fundraising and fund-expenditure practices of charitable
organizations); Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1601 n.39 (noting that most chari-
ties cooperate with one of three national "watchdog" agencies that provide in-
formation to donors, including the percentage of funds a charity commits to
fundraising, spends on programs and unexpended income). While modem
technology and business necessity has increased the flow of information about
the charitable sector, some argue that an information void about charities
persists. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 1, at 843-44 (identifying informa-
tion deficiency in the nonprofit sector). Without sufficient or reliable sources
of information, donors must either invest time researching charities or simply
remain uninformed. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, United Charities: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 28 PUB. POLY 323, 325 (1980). Despite a lack of information,
donors may contribute to an organization that fits their ideological beliefs,
with little thought about the efficiency of the organization's operation. See id.
at 338. Another factor contributing to the information void is that many non-
profits produce services whose ultimate worth is unknown. See id. at 324.
For example, Rose-Ackerman argues that cost-benefit analysis is difficult to
apply to social services such as counseling. See id.
64. See Tuckman, supra note 58, at 206-07 (discussing the role of capital
in nonprofit firms).
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in the relevant markets for labor, capital and other resources
necessary for operation.65 As it develops strategies for success
in the charitable marketplace, the organization must also de-
cide how to maximize its resources and whether to compete or
cooperate with other organizations in light of market dynamics
as well as the laws and customs of society.66
The charitable marketplace of today, characterized by
modern technology and business plans, is distinctly different
than the one in place when the antitrust laws were enacted.67
Consequently, if we are to give deference to the mindset of the
51st Congress that drafted the Sherman Act, it is important to
note that charity in the 1890s was predominantly local and
grounded in religious and social communities. 68 The days of
"corporate" charities and mass fundraising did not come until
later.69 Ironically, the great charitable trusts that emerged
65. See id. A charitable organization engages in capital investment when
it purchases tools or skills of the labor force. See id. at 206. A charity con-
sumes when it uses funds to pay for salaries or fringe benefits, purchases ad-
vertising or maintains its facilities. See id. In this way, charities engage in
cross-subsidization, such that income derived for one purpose is diverted to
another. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 877-78.
66. See Hammack & Young, supra note 1, at 4.
67. In recent years the nonprofit sector has taken on new dimensions.
"Nearly three quarters of all charitable 501(c)(3) organizations, excluding
most religious organizations and private foundations, have been founded since
1970." Overview and Executive Summary: The State of the Independent Sector
(visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http//www.indepsec.org/programs/researcb/almanacL
overview.html>. The federal tax exemption has also been extended beyond its
original scope to include newer areas of charity, such as the performing arts.
See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 882. While the charitable sector has evolved
in new directions over time, charitable organizations have historically enjoyed
a privileged legal status. The Statute of Charitable Uses is generally re-
garded as the first time charities were recognized under the law. See 43 ELIz.
(1601) c.4. That statute divided charity into three general classes: relief and
assistance of the poor and needy, promotion of education, and maintenance of
public buildings and works. See ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 169-70. The
legal inquiry was whether the purpose of the gift was within the principle and
reason of the statute, although not expressly named in it. See id. Similarly,
nineteenth-century nonprofits were largely protected from lawsuits, enjoyed
the power to acquire, retain and increase endowments, and were exempt from
local, state and federal taxes. See Hammack & Young, supra note 1, at 10.
68. See Espinoza, supra note 57, at 638. Historically, public charities
were governed as trusts. See id. at 636. Trustees were accountable to the
courts and were personally liable for losses the charity suffered as a result of
negligence or mismanagement. See id.
69. The corporatization of charities began around World War H, when
both charitable foundations and small operating charities began forming as
corporations. See Espinoza, supra note 57, at 641-42. By the 1950s, three
fourths of existing foundations were incorporated. See id Just as the notion
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from the Industrial Revolution were made possible by the same
concentration of economic power the 51st Congress sought to
dismantle.7 0
D. "TRADE OR COMMERCE" AND CHARITABLE GIVING
The solicitation of charitable contributions is an activity
pursued by a charitable organization, but it cannot successfully
occur without a return from a donor. Thus, the goal of solicita-
tion is a transaction that occurs between the charity and a pa-
tron who contributes to it. Both the charity and the donor
benefit from the exchange. The charity is able to fund its
charitable operation as a result of the gift. 71 Although a do-
nor's contribution may be considered an altruistic act with lit-
tle or no return,7 2 it may also be characterized as a "consump-
tion purchase," where the donor gains something of value in
exchange for his or her gift. 73
A donor's return on his or her charitable investment can
take many forms. The most obvious example is the tax advan-
tage afforded by the Internal Revenue Code.74 The return may
also take the form of a privilege. For instance, a sizeable gift to
Carnegie Hall might earn the donor a coveted seat on the
of corporate charities was an undiscovered phenomenon in the late nineteenth
century, so too was fundraising as we know it today. A review of legal dic-
tionaries published in the 1890s reveals that "fundraising" was not a recog-
nized common law term.
70. See Catherine C. Eckel & Richard Steinberg, Competition, Perform-
ance, and Public Policy Toward Nonprofits, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN
A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 57, 77 (noting that many prominent
charitable nonprofits bear the names of powerful monopolists such as Rocke-
feller, Mellon, Carnegie and Ford). One study found that wealthy individuals
in the nineteenth century feared the political power of the general population,
which in turn led them to find new ways to bring society under their control.
See Brody, supra note 22, at 438. The study concluded that industrial mag-
nets used charitable contributions to fund foundations as a means of influ-
encing research, education and the media, with the ultimate goal of reforming
social, economic and political life. See id.
71. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing charities'
expenditures of donations).
72. See Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1599 (describing the common concep-
tion of charitable giving as a unilateral act).
73. See id. (explaining how charitable donations are "consumption pur-
chases" in terms of marginal satisfaction and utility to the donor); see also
Hansmann, supra note 1, at 855-59 (characterizing contributions as a form of
voluntary price discrimination for public goods in which those who value the
good most pay the highest price and those who value it least pay less).
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (1994) (allowing taxpayers who contribute to
§ 501(c)(3) organizations to deduct their contributions).
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Hall's board of directors.7 5 A smaller donation will at least con-
tribute to the donor's and others' enjoyment of the performing
arts. On a more esoteric level, the donor may gain satisfaction
from contributing to others' welfare, feel that the donation in-
creases his or her social status, consider the gift part of a social
contract, or simply find that giving assuages religious or moral
guilt.
7 6
III. THE NINTH AND FOURTH CIRCUITS PART WAYS
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT: DEDICATIONAND EVERLASTING LOVE
TO ANIMALS V. HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
The issue of charitable fundraising was central in Dedica-
tion and Everlasting Love to Animals v. Humane Society of the
United States.77 Both DELTA and the Humane Society are or-
ganized to support the welfare of animals and both are funded
75. See Monica Langley, Concerted Efforts: Even CEOs Sweat out Carne-
gie Hall Tryouts; For the Board, That Is" WALL ST. J., July 30, 1998, at Al. A
fringe benefit of a seat on Carnegie Hall's board is the business contacts it af-
fords its members. For example, a chairman of a financial conglomerate ac-
knowledged that a merger with another financial conglomerate was "born" in
the Hall's private Club Room. See id. Smaller and more common benefits
may include the charity's publication of an individual or corporate donor's
name in the charity's newsletter or posting a "thank you" banner or sign in
the donor's honor at a charity event. Depending on the circulation of the pub-
lication or exposure of the public display of gratitude, a charity's "thank you"
may be a powerful advertising medium. The IRS has not let such benefits go
unchecked. In one case, the IRS recognized the commercial potential of a for-
profit corporation that sponsored a college football bowl game under the guise
of a "gift." See HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 6.17(b), at 539 (citing IRS Tech. Adv.
Mem. 9147007 (TAM)). The TAM characterized the fruits of that gift as un-
related business income because the payment was for a package of valuable
services. See id.
76. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 17 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (providing three
utilitarian theories for charitable giving); Hammack & Young, supra note 1, at
3 (noting that in exchange for contributing, a donor at minimum receives the
assurance that his or her beliefs and values will be served, while other donors
may receive recognition or other nonmaterial benefits); Russell Hardin, Altru-
ism and Mutual Advantage, 67 SOC. SERV. REV. 358, 362 (1993) (arguing that
benevolence tends to contribute to the egoism of the benefactor); Eric A. Pos-
ner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 567 (considering non-altruistic motives for giving);
Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1599 (listing potential benefits a donor receives
from his or her gift as possible explanations for why people donate to charita-
ble causes).
77. 50 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 1995).
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by public donations.78 In its claim, DELTA alleged that the
Humane Society violated sections one and two of the Sherman
Act by restraining competition in the market for charitable do-
nations and attempting to monopolize that market.7 9 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the Humane
Society on grounds that the organization did not have a major-
ity share of the relevant market and that DELTA neither al-
leged nor offered the requisite evidence of antitrust injury.8 0
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on separate grounds, finding
that the solicitation of charitable donations is not "trade or
commerce" and therefore that DELTA failed to state a viable
claim. 8 1 Circuit Judge Noonan relied on the Supreme Court's
definitions of "commerce" and "restraint of trade" to support
the conclusion that text and precedent "forbid[ I extension of
the Sherman Act to charitable fundraising never envisaged as
trade by the common law."82 The court reasoned that despite
78. See id. at 711. The charitable nature of supporting animal welfare
has been statutorily and judicially recognized. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1994) (exempting organizations that prevent cruelty to animals from federal
income tax); In re Estate of Coleman, 138 P. 992, 993 (Cal. 1914) (finding tes-
tator's $30,000 gift to build a fountain for the benefit of thirsty animals and
birds a "charitable purpose" such that the Rule of Perpetuities did not apply).
79. See DELTA, 50 F.3d at 711. DELTA also alleged that in furtherance
of these antitrust violations the Humane Society attempted to cause the At-
torney General of California to take disciplinary action against DELTA and to
cause "providers of valuable services" to discriminate against DELTA. Id. In
its motion for summary judgment the Humane Society argued that the anti-
trust laws did not apply to the parties, that the parties did not operate in the
same market, and that in any event, it did not have monopoly power in the
relevant market. See id. In support of its motion the Humane Society sub-
mitted evidence that its expenses exceeded its annual receipt of donations.
See id. For its part, DELTA submitted evidence of its animal rescue work,
which included publishing books and magazine articles promoting animal wel-
fare. See id. at 712. DELTA also submitted evidence that it had been success-
ful in collecting out-of-state donations in the past. See id.
80. See id. at 712.
8L See id. at 714.
82. Id. at 712-13. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 51st Congress in-
tended "trade or commerce" to be defined in a restrictive sense, and cited
Chief Justice John Marshall's definition of "commerce" in the context of the
commerce clause. See id. at 712-13 (defining "commerce" as "the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches") (citing
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824)). The court's reliance on
Chief Justice Marshall as authority for a restrictive meaning of "commerce"
seems misplaced, considering Marshall's broad interpretation of the commerce
clause. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 (defining the commerce power as "com-
plete in itself, [which] may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution"). The
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the reputation, prestige and money the Humane Society and
its officers derived from donations, the act of collecting those
donations is not trade or commerce under the meaning of the
antitrust laws.83 Accordingly, the opinion dismissed the dis-
trict court's inquiry into the Humane Society's share of the
relevant charitable market as "distinctly odd.., because there
isn't any market."84 The opinion did acknowledge that in some
contexts, a nonprofit organization does engage in trade or
commerce 85 and that the Sherman Act's objectives of efficiency,
minimum production cost, innovation, equal market access and
fair distribution are important in a nonprofit environment. 86
Ultimately, though, the court failed to see the nexus between
the antitrust laws and charitable fundraising.87
The Ninth Circuit's opinion implies that it generally dis-
approves of the antitrust laws invading the charitable domain.
For example, the court highlighted United States v. Brown
University, a case in which the Third Circuit found that a non-
profit university engages in commerce where it awards schol-
arships, but remanded the case for further evaluation of the
challenged conduct under the Rule of Reason.88 In doing so,
DELTA court also noted that a restraint of trade was well understood at
common law and that the Sherman Act simply codified the common law tradi-
tion. See DELTA, 50 F.3d at 712. Moreover, the court surmised that the Su-
preme Court has embraced the common law traditions of trade or commerce
and rejected the expansion of those concepts to embrace other activities. See
id. at 712-13 (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the Sherman
Act to a union's sitdown strike) (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 495 (1940)).
83. See id. at 714; cf. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d
Cir. 1993) (stating that regardless of whether MIT's motive was "altruism,
self-enhancement or a combination of the two," MIT received "increased pres-
tige and influence" in exchange for providing financial aid).
84 Id. at 714.
85. See id. at 713 (acknowledging that a nonprofit does not enjoy blanket
immunity from antitrust liability, but stating that "it is a leap ... to the con-
clusion that charitable activities are subject to the Sherman Act when they do
not constitute trade in the sense of the common law").
86. See id.; cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427(2d Cir. 1945) ("Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that im-
munity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant ... necessary
to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.").
87. See DELTA, 50 F.3d at 714.
88. See id. at 714 (citing Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 658). The court in Brown
University strongly suggested that an evaluation of the defendant's procom-
petitive social welfare justifications under the Rule of Reason would lead to
the conclusion that the defendant's conduct did not violate the Sherman Act.
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the DELTA court suggested that even if the antitrust laws did
apply to charitable fundraising, the Humane Society should
not be held liable for its conduct. 89 The opinion concluded with
the court expressing in dicta its concern that if the Sherman
Act were extended to charitable fumdraising, the law would in-
evitably become a "hunting license" to attack everything from
church fairs to the solicitation of voluntary blood donors to en-
gagement or marriage.90
B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT: VIRGnvLA VERMICULITE V. W.R.
GRACE Co.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be alone in providing a blan-
ket exemption to charitable transactions under the Sherman
Act. In Virginia Vermiculite v. W.R. Grace Co.,91 the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a donation of land to a nonprofit
organization was commercial in nature. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant mineral producer's donation of mining
rights to the defendant nonprofit organization was an exclu-
sionary act designed to keep the plaintiff out of the mineral
market in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act.92 After a review of the relevant case law, the district court
suggested that the defendant's nonprofit status outweighed the
anticompetitive effects of its actions.93 Accordingly, the district
court concluded that the nature of the donative transaction,
See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 678; see also supra note 41 (discussing the Rule of
Reason and its application to nonprofits).
89. Perhaps more telling than the court's discussion of Brown University
is what followed it. A citation referenced a commentary on the case arguing
that the Sherman Act was not intended to reach the activities of organizations
embracing social causes and that even Rule of Reason analysis is inappropri-
ate. See id. at 714 (citing Stachtiaris, supra note 26). Another article cited by
the court noted that after remand, the Brown case ended with an out of court
settlement where the defendants admitted no guilt and were allowed to con-
tinue sharing scholarship information. See id. (citing William H. Honan,
M.T. Wins Right to Share Financial Aid Data in Antitrust Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993, at A13).
90. See DELTA, 50 F.3d at 714. The court cited no authority to support
its prediction that such an atrocity would befall society if the Sherman Act
were applied to fundraising.
91. 156 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 1998 WL 554196.
92 See id. at 538.
93. See 965 F. Supp. 802, 815 (W.D. Va. 1997) ("The purpose of the Act is
to ensure that competition reigns supreme in the business world. But the
Sherman Antitrust Act makes no value judgment that competition in the
business world should be elevated over pursuit of noncommercial social or po-
litical objectives by noncommercial social or political organizations.").
1999] 1537
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
elucidated by an examination of the nonprofit's noncommercial
motives to protect a natural resource, precluded antitrust li-
ability.94
The Fourth Circuit reversed on grounds that the "dona-
tive" transaction between the defendant mineral producer and
the nonprofit was "fundamentally commercial." To support its
holding, the court cited the donation's effect on the commercial
market for the mineral, as well as the direct commercial bene-
fits the transaction produced for the nonprofit and its man-
agement and members.95 The court rejected the notion that a
nonprofit's noncommercial, sociopolitical objectives wholly ex-
empt it from the antitrust laws.96 Rather, a review of the
Sherman Act's text and precedent led the court to conclude
that the law is triggered by an organization's commercial con-
duct, irrespective of its social welfare goals.97 Upon an exami-
nation of the evidence, the court found that the behavior at is-
sue was essentially commercial, and remanded the case for
further proceedings.98
IV. ANALYSIS: CHARITABLE FUNDRAISING IS "TRADE
OR COMMERCE" UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
A. WHERE THE DELTA COURT WENT WRONG
The Ninth Circuit in DELTA concluded that charitable
fundraising is not "trade or commerce" without examining the
nature of the behavior at issue. Rather, its conclusion was
based solely on a restrictive interpretation of the text. A prac-
tical reading of the opinion suggests that the Ninth Circuit did
not want to smear a charitable transaction with an anticom-
petitive label or burden a charity with an undue legal respon-
sibility. This reading is reasonable considering that the court
failed to acknowledge the commercial dynamics of charitable
fundraising or to heed precedent and determine whether the
Humane Society's alleged monopolization of donations to sup-
94. See id. at 818.
95. See 156 F.3d at 541. The court went on to explain that an organiza-
tion that may otherwise be exempt from the antitrust laws loses its exemption
by conspiring with a nonexempt party. See id. Regardless of motive, it is suf-
ficient that the organization acquiesced in a restraint of trade with the knowl-
edge that it would have anticompetitive effects. See id.
96. See id. at 540.
97. See id. at 541.
98. See id. at 542.
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port the welfare of animals was motivated by commercial or
anticompetitive intent. Thus, the DELTA court's holding that
fandraising is outside the meaning of "trade or commerce" cre-
ated a blanket exemption of that activity from the antitrust
laws. However, an exemption in this case is misplaced, as it
was created without support of the Sherman Act's text or
precedent and without distinguishing the commercial aspects
of charitable fundraising from trade or commerce in the normal
course of business. In short, by failing to consider the nature of
fundraising and how it implicates the antitrust laws, the Ninth
Circuit in DELTA strayed from the carefully pruned path of
Sherman Act jurisprudence where the breadth of the text is
honored,99 alleged antitrust violations are carefully exam-
ined,100 and exemptions are not lightly granted.101
The DELTA court conducted its textual analysis of the an-
titrust laws in a restrictive mode that caused it to lose sight of
its duty to scrutinize carefully alleged anticompetitive behav-
ior.102 While judicial restraint is a virtue in statutory interpre-
tation, Congress wrote the Sherman Act in broad textual
strokes, 0 3 knowing that a combination of words could not pos-
sibly capture every activity that the Act was intended to con-
demn. 04 In light of Congress's design and intent, the courts
have brought the text to bear on a wide range of anticompeti-
tive trade and commercial activity, wherever it might occur.105
Where the courts have determined that the antitrust laws do
not apply to a particular activity, the result has not been
reached in haste. Only after the alleged anticompetitive be-
havior has been closely examined for commercial and anticom-
petitive motives will it pass unscathed from antitrust review. 06
99. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the broad stokes
with which the Sherman Act is written).
100. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing how even
otherwise noncommercial transactions may be subject to antitrust review if
undertaken with a commercial purpose or knowledge of anticompetitive ef-
fects).
10L See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (describing courts' re-
luctance to grant immunity under the antitrust laws).
102. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the court's opinion in DELTA).
103. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing presump-
tions against exemptions and how an otherwise noncommercial activity might
be subject to antitrust review).
106. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
1999] 1539
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The DELTA court reasoned that Congress chose the words
"trade" and "commerce" for their restrictive meaning. Its first
step in doing so was to quote Chief Justice John Marshall's
definition of "commerce" in the context of the Commerce
Clause.1 07 It is ironic at best, and contrary to legal and histori-
cal logic at worst, to use Justice Marshall's interpretation of
the Commerce Clause in support of a restrictive textual read-
ing. Justice Marshall was anything but confined in his inter-
pretation of that constitutional text, and in fact read the lan-
guage of the Commerce Clause broadly.108
The Ninth Circuit also professed its allegiance to the
common law in justifying its restrictive reading of the Sherman
Act.109 Although the Supreme Court uses common law to in-
form its interpretation of the Sherman Act, it has not limited
itself to common law notions. For instance, when the Sherman
Act was enacted the common law did not consider trade or
commerce to take place in the liberal arts or the learned pro-
fessions.110 Since then the Court has recognized that commer-
cial activity does take place in those contexts and has held that
neither is immune from antitrust liability under the Sherman
Act.' The activities of local governments were also exempt
from antitrust review at common law.112 The Court has not
confined itself to this limitation, either. Rather, local govern-
ments are only exempt where they act with an affirmatively
expressed mandate from the state." 3
By reading the Sherman Act in a restrictive vein and con-
cluding that charitable fundraising is immune from the anti-
107. See supra note 82 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1(1824)).
108. See supra note 82 (discussing Marshall's broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause).
109. See supra note 82 (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
497-98 (1940), where the Court found that the Sherman Act is aimed at "only
those [acts] which are comparable to restraints deemed illegal at common
law" and is limited to "restriction or suppression of commercial competition").
110. See supra notes 12, 44 and accompanying text (discussing common
law definition of "trade").
111- See supra notes 12, 35 and accompanying text (discussing Goldfarb's
finding that Congress did not intend a sweeping exclusion of the professions
and the Court's refusal in United States v. Brown University to grant blanketimmunity to nonprofit educational institutions from the antitrust laws).
112. See supra note 44 (discussing common law exclusion of local govern-
ments from antitrust liability).
113. See supra note 33 (discussing when extension of state action immu-
nity to municipal conduct is appropriate).
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trust laws, the DELTA court foreclosed a considered analysis of
the specific behavior at issue. Had it scrutinized the activity
more closely, the court would have recognized that fundraising
is a business activity that charities undertake in support of
their missions.114
In its most basic form, fumdraising is the exchange of
money for a charitable product.1'5 Donors contribute, or pur-
chase, charitable goods and services they deem valuable. Of-
ten, donors do not directly see, touch or benefit from their
charitable dollars in action. For instance, when a donor con-
tributes to a charity whose mission is to increase educational
opportunities for students in a particular community, that do-
nor's only connection to the program might be the check he or
she wrote. If the program is successful, the students are the
direct beneficiaries. The donor may also benefit in a number of
ways. If the donor employs members of the community, he or
she will benefit from a heightened quality of the labor pool in
that market. More educational opportunities may also con-
tribute to making the community in which the donor lives safer
and more productive. At the very least, the donor is likely to
have gained some measure of satisfaction from his or her
gift. 116
While the production of charitable goods and services may
be the ultimate goal of an organization that raises funds, the
reality of doing business dictates that some of the money it
collects will be allocated to the organization's infrastructure. 117
Even a soup kitchen must pay utility bills. More sophisticated
organizations operate with the benefit of modern technology,
professional management and other accommodations that
come with a price tag. Beyond these operational expenditures,
many charitable dollars are re-circulated into the "fimdraising
mill," the organizational apparatus that is dedicated to pro-
ducing more donations.118 While it may be axiomatic that "it
takes money to make money," in some cases more money is
11l See supra Part H.B (discussing commercial elements of fundraising).
115. See supra Part II.B.
116. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing potential
benefits donors may receive in exchange for their gifts).
117. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing expendi-
tures of charitable dollars to this end).
118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Espinoza's char-
acterization of the "fundraising mill" and the fimdraising programs employed
by charities).
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taken into the fundraising mill than is given to the intended
beneficiaries of the charitable product.1 9 There is no common
denominator for overhead and fundraising expenditures, but
an analysis of the fundraising transaction is incomplete with-
out acknowledging where the dollars are disbursed after they
are raised. In short, fundraising fuels the multifaceted com-
mercial enterprise of the charitable sector.
B. WHERE THE ViRGnLIA VERMICULITE COURT WAS RIGHT
In contrast to DELTA, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Vir-
ginia Vermiculite represents a considered analysis of the al-
leged anticompetitive behavior at issue and a careful review of
whether and how that behavior is subject to antitrust review.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the lower court's suggestion that
the defendant's nonprofit status outweighed the anticompeti-
tive effects of its actions.12 0 Rather than accept the charity de-
fense as a bulletproof shield against antitrust liability, the
Fourth Circuit examined the evidence and determined that the
nonprofit's conduct affected the commercial market and pro-
duced direct commercial benefits for the nonprofit itself, as
well as its management and members. 121 The court went on to
emphasize that even if the defendant were otherwise exempt
by virtue of being a nonprofit organization, it would forfeit its
immunity merely by acquiescing in its co-defendant's restraint
of trade, knowing the restraint would have anticompetitive ef-
fects.122 Finally, contrary to the district court, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stressed that the nature of the nonprofit's intent is irrele-
vant in the analysis.123 With this line of reasoning the court
implied that a mere cursory or overly forgiving review of a
119. See supra note 59.
120. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing the district
court's opinion in Virginia Vermiculite).
121. See supra note 95 and accompanying test (discussing this part of theFourth Circuit's opinion). Notably, the DELTA court dismissed the notion
that the reputation, prestige and money that fundraising garnered for theHumane Society and its officers implicated its fundraising activities under the
antitrust laws. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 95. This is in line with other courts' holdings that
where exemptions exist, they are fragile and may easily be lost. See supra
note 33 (discussing how Noerr-Pennington immunity may be lost if the peti-
tioning involves fraudulent actions, "sham" litigation, private standard-setting
or situations where the government being petitioned is acting in a commercial
capacity).
123. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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nonprofit's behavior is not an appropriate substitute for thor-
ough antitrust analysis.
A comparison of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in DELTA
and the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Virginia Vermiculite
shows that the DELTA court failed to properly assess the
claims before it. Although the court in Virginia Vermiculite ul-
timately found the nonprofit liable under the Sherman Act,
had the DELTA court engaged in a similar analysis of the Hu-
mane Society's alleged anticompetitive behavior, it might nev-
ertheless have concluded that the Humane Society did not
violate the law. If the Ninth Circuit had acknowledged the
commercial nature of charitable fundraising, it would have
considered the circumstances surrounding and rationales for
the Humane Society's activity.124 The evidence may have
shown that the Humane Society's conduct was not sufficient to
be condemned under the antitrust laws.125 Alternatively, the
Humane Society may have convinced the court that none-
conomic justifications for its behavior excused its anticompeti-
tive effects. 126 It is also possible that a thorough review of the
Humane Society's actions would have rendered it liable under
the antitrust laws. While these possibilities are pure conjec-
ture in a retrospective analysis, they offer reasoning that
would have brought a more legally sound conclusion to the
case.
C. AN EXEMPTION FOR CHARITABLE FUNDRAISING IS
INAPPROPRIATE
Once it is established that fundraising constitutes "trade
or commerce," it is apparent that the DELTA court created an
exemption for this activity under the Sherman Act. The import
of this finding cannot be underestimated, because the Sherman
Act does not exempt any trade or commercial activities on its
face and judicial exemptions from the Act are generally not fa-
124. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Rule of Reason
analysis); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that federal
courts are often reluctant to condemn a nonprofit under the Sherman Act for
activities that promote the public interest).
125. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that mere posses-
sion of monopoly power is not in itself an antitrust violation).
126. See supra note 41 (discussing the possibility that noneconomic justifi-
cations should be factored into the Rule of Reason equation). Although it is
debatable whether the social benefit argument is legally sound, there is at
least support for this proposition in the case law.
15431999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
vored. 127 True, the courts have made exceptions and granted
certain immunities under the Act.128 A charitable cause would
provide a tempting opportunity to find an exemption in the
spirit of the Sherman Act even though the letter of the law
does not provide for it. Nevertheless, a closer look at antitrust
jurisprudence reveals that more than a charitable spirit is re-
quired to justify an exemption to the Sherman Act. Rather, ajudicial exemption should reflect a compromise between the
Sherman Act and constitutional principles or Congress's ex-
plicit intent that a different federal statute occupy the field.
State action immunity from the antitrust laws is grounded
in principles of federalism.129 The Supreme Court recognized
that applying the Sherman Act to the actions of a state im-
pinged upon the states' police power and their ability to act as
sovereigns.130 By recognizing an exemption for states, the
Court did not validate anticompetitive state action. Rather, it
struck a balance between judicial review and respect for the
democratic process.131 Principles of federalism also explain the
limited exemption that is afforded to local governments and
other state actors. Since those entities do not enjoy the same
sovereign status as the states, their conduct must be expressly
directed by the state in order for immunity to attach.132
State sovereignty is not threatened by applying the
Sherman Act to charitable fundraising. While charities may
receive grants from the government and perform functions that
government might otherwise perform, charitable organizations
are not sovereign government actors. Contrary to state actors,
whose immunity is conditioned upon a clearly articulated
mandate from the legislature, charities tend to fill a void where
the government has decided not to act, or at least to act in a
lesser capacity. 133 Moreover, since the absence of a profit mo-
tive is no guarantee that an organization will act in the best in-
127. See supra notes 34-37 (discussing courts' reluctance to grant immu-
nity from antitrust laws).
128. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing exemptions from
antitrust laws).
129. See supra note 33 (discussing state action immunity).
130. See supra note 33.
131. See supra note 33.
132. See supra note 33 (discussing the applicability of state action immu-
nity to local governments).
133. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing charities' role in
providing services that the government cannot or does not provide).
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terests of its consumers, 134 some measure of judicial oversight
is required to enforce compliance with the law.135 The justifica-
tion for such oversight is especially strong in the charitable
sector because donors may not have enough information to
monitor the activities of the organizations to which they con-
tribute136 and charities are ultimately not accountable to their
direct beneficiaries.1 37 Therefore, without judicial oversight,
anticompetitive behavior in the commercial sector would likely
go unchecked.
Immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is another
example of a balance between the Constitution and federal an-
titrust policies. 138  The Noerr-Pennington exemption is
grounded in the First Amendment and protects a private ac-
tor's right to petition the government, regardless of anticom-
petitive intent or effect.139 Nevertheless, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine is not an impermeable exemption; it does not apply if
legitimate petitioning activities are accompanied by illegal or
fraudulent actions, are based on "sham" litigation, or involve a
government entity that is acting in its commercial capacity. 140
Applying the Sherman Act to charitable fundraising does
not violate free speech in the charitable marketplace. By pro-
moting the policies of competition and consumer welfare, the
antitrust laws actually protect a charity's free speech from be-
ing suppressed through unlawful restraints.141 Rather than
allowing monopolistic organizations to unlawfully manipulate
the charitable market to the exclusion of smaller and less pow-
erful charities, the antitrust laws are a means to prohibit such
anticompetitive tactics and ensure that freedom of expression
prevails. Accordingly, the balance between the antitrust laws
134. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 63 (discussing the information void in the charitable
sector).
137. While it may be argued that a charity's anticompetitive conduct may
be policed by the power of the donor's pocketbook, the void of reliable and con-
sistent information in the charitable sector makes that prospect less likely.
See supra note 63.
138. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Noerr-
Pennington doctrine).
139. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
141. In this way, antitrust laws and the First Amendment promote the
same interest: a diverse and growing nonprofit sector where small or less
powerful charities are not boxed out of the market. See Espinoza, supra note
57, at 667 (explaining that these were the goals of the Court in Schaumburg).
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and the First Amendment is achieved without exempting
charitable fundraising from Sherman Act jurisdiction.
Finally, the non-statutory labor exemption reflects a com-
promise between antitrust policies and federal labor law. 42 Al-
though anticompetitive activity can occur in the labor sector,
the courts have found that the National Labor Relations Act
affords parties adequate tools to protect against and remedy
such conduct.43 Deferring to Congress's intent that federal la-
bor law exclusively govern this area, the courts have restricted
the Sherman Act's jurisdiction over labor issues to the narrow-
est of circumstances. 144
Unlike the confluence of the Sherman Act and federal la-
bor law that produced the non-statutory labor exemption, there
is not a merger between antitrust law and the law governing
charities to justify similar immunity for charitable fundraising.
The National Labor Relations Act is a comprehensive and uni-
fied federal code representing Congress's intent that the stat-
ute occupy the field of labor law. By contrast, charitable fund-
raising is regulated by a panoply of state laws that are
notoriously inconsistent from state to state. 45 Where compre-
hensive state charitable solicitation statutes are in place, they
are generally concerned with registration and reporting re-
quirements for charitable organizations and professional fund-
raisers. 46 These laws have more to do with preventing con-
sumer fraud than they do with maintaining competition among
charities.147
While state laws governing charities are fragmented and
inconsistent, the Internal Revenue Code is a uniform and
deeply entrenched force in the charitable sector.148 Federal tax
laws focus on which activities of an organization are exempt for
tax purposes and which are accountable to the Internal Reve-
nue Service. The Internal Revenue Code does not, however,
142. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing Hopkins' overview of
state laws regulating charities). Hopkins notes that there is no federal law
dedicated to governing charitable fimdraising, "nor is there any immediate
prospect of one." HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 6, at 427.
146. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing Hopkins' review of
state laws regulating charities).
147. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 3, 22 (discussing Internal Revenue Code sections that
apply to charities).
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provide parties the tools with which to defend against anti-
competitive conduct. Moreover, these laws do not represent
Congress's intent to restructure the area of charitable fund-
raising under a comprehensive federal statute, as was the case
with the National Labor Relations Act. Absent some overrid-
ing reason why these state or federal laws should exclusively
occupy the charitable sector, an exemption for fundraising
analogous to the statutory labor exemption is inappropriate.
In addition to these well-established exemptions, the
courts also have recognized certain situations in which alleged
anticompetitive conduct is not properly classified as trade or
commerce.1 49 Such determinations are carefully circumscribed
and are made only after close scrutiny of the behavior at issue.
For instance, an entity's intent can be the determining factor
in deciding whether an activity constitutes commerce. 150 Thus,
while accrediting secondary schools may be the antithesis of
commercial behavior if there is no commercial motivation be-
hind the act, if the same activity were motivated by commercial
intent it would be subject to the antitrust laws. 151 In a similar
manner, the Ninth Circuit could have endeavored to classify
the particular fundraising activity in DELTA as noncommer-
cial by examining the intent behind152 and effect of the Hu-
mane Society's conduct.153 By concluding its review with an as-
sumption that fundraising is not trade or commerce, the
DELTA court did not avail itself of the opportunity to justify
why that behavior is not commercial activity.
This is the point at which the Ninth and Fourth Circuits
split.'5 4 Because the issue of charitable fundraising was not be-
fore it, the Fourth Circuit did not have the need or occasion to
take issue with the DELTA court's holding. Yet by refusing to
accept DELTA's premise that a charitable transaction enjoys
antitrust immunity, the Fourth Circuit implicitly rejected the
DELTA court's conclusion that a blanket exemption is appro-
149. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's finding in Marjorie Webster that petitioner's accreditation activities
were not trade or commerce under the Sherman Act).
150. See supra note 35.
151. See supra note 35.
152. See supra note 35.
153. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia
Vermiculite court's reasoning that a transaction's effect on the market is evi-
dence of'its commercial nature).
154 See generally supra Part I (discussing the opinions in DELTA and
Virginia Vermiculite).
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priate for charitable transactions. In proceeding as it did, the
Fourth Circuit in Virginia Vermiculite properly considered the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged anticom-
petitive behavior to determine whether it was commercial in
nature.
D. APPROPRIATE REVIEW Is BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE
CONDUCT AND THE TOTALITY OF THE SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES
In United States v. Brown University, the Third Circuit
aptly summarized that "[c]ourts classify a transaction as com-
mercial or noncommercial based on the nature of the conduct
in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances." 155
According to antitrust jurisprudence, the "totality of the sur-
rounding circumstances" includes the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, the antitrust common law, the text of the Act,
and the facts of the particular case before the court. A proper
analysis of the claims in DELTA would have included a review
of each of these factors and related the broad context of the
Sherman Act to the particular conduct at issue in the case.
While the legislative history of the Sherman Act provides
evidence that Congress considered the application of the law in
non-traditional business contexts, it does not resolve the is-
sue.156 In the debate that occurred before the bill was enacted,
the Senate discussed whether the antitrust law would apply to
the temperance movement. 157 Four points about this piece of
legislative history render it neutral in the analysis of trade or
commerce as it pertains to flndraising. First, Congress ulti-
mately chose not to create an exemption for the temperance
movement, nor did it exclude any other kind of moral or educa-
tional organization that might be organized. 5 8 Second, the
Senate debated the option of exempting organizations from the
Act's reach, not the specific activity of any organization.159 The
Supreme Court has flatly rejected the notion that moral or
155. 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993).
156. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 42-43 (discussing sections one and two of the
Sherman Act).
158. See supra note 38 (discussing Senate debate about the issue).
159. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Koon argues that the dis-
tinction between entities and their conduct provides one explanation for why
nonprofit organizations cannot automatically escape liability. See supra note
37.
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educational organizations are exempt from the Sherman Act
simply by virtue of their social welfare goals.1 60 Next, charities
in the nineteenth century did not bear the same resemblance to
businesses as they do today.'61 Since the common law was
fickle in its application of antitrust principles in non-
traditional business sectors 62 and antitrust laws would not be
applied in those sectors until later,163 it logically follows that
Congress would not have considered the antitrust laws to ap-
ply in that context. Finally, modem fundraising was a yet-
undiscovered phenomenon in the charitable sector and ac-
cordingly, the activity was not subject to common law antitrust
review. 64 It would have been impossible for Congress or the
early courts to consider the commercial dynamics of a concept
that was not familiar to them.
Although the Supreme Court has sanctioned the inquiry
into the legislative history of the Sherman Act,165 such evi-
dence, by itself, should not be the turning point of any judicial
analysis. Where it does not directly address the issue at hand,
legislative history should be even less controlling. In the end,
the legislative history of the Sherman Act is inconclusive about
whether trade or commerce would have encompassed fund-
raising in the minds of the 51st Congress.
The next step in evaluating the totality of the surrounding
circumstances is to evaluate the pertinent common law. Like
the legislative history, common law informs the application of
the Sherman Act, but it does not erect barriers beyond which
the law cannot reach. Common law did not subject trade or
professional organizations or local government entities to anti-
trust scrutiny.166 Nevertheless, modem courts have applied
160. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing how chari-
table organizations in the 19th century were closely related to the local and
religious communities and that business dynamics did not play a significant
role in their operation until after World War II).
162. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the common law
view that antitrust law did not apply to the liberal arts, learned professions or
local government entities).
163. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing courts' ap-
plication of antitrust law in non-traditional business sector).
164. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that "fundraising"
was not a common law term recognized in the legal dictionaries circa 1890).
165. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)).
166. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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the Sherman Act in each of these contexts. 167 The courts' deci-
sions to do so are not irreconcilable with common law. Rather,
trade and professional organizations and local government en-
tities did not generally perform the same commercial functions
at common law that they came to perform in later years. 168 The
charitable sector has undergone a similar transformation since
common law prevailed in the area of antitrust. 69 Perhaps the
most telling evidence of the evolution is that the word "fund-
raising" was not in the legal vernacular at the time the
Sherman Act was passed. o70 Today the concept is as familiar to
legislators as it is to the general public.
When Congress enacted the Sherman Act, it did so against
the backdrop of common law. Neither common law nor Con-
gress envisioned a charitable sector that looks and acts like the
traditional business sector. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the common law provides a solid starting point for the
fundamental antitrust principles that the Sherman Act was in-
tended to promulgate. It is unreasonable, however, to use the
common law as a conclusive thesaurus for modern antitrust
law.
The text of the Sherman Act is the next step in evaluating
the totality of the surrounding circumstances. The pivotal text
for the Ninth Circuit in DELTA was that which pertains to
"trade or commerce."' 7 ' Yet, to read those terms to the exclu-
sion of the rest of the Act is illogical. Whether an activity is
commercial in nature is merely the threshold question in anti-
trust review. 72 More must be shown for the court to find a
violation. Section one of the Act says that a "restraint of trade"
is unlawful, not mere participation in trade.173 Monopolizing,
attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize com-
merce is unlawful under section two. 74 Conduct short of those
anticompetitive standards does not violate the law.
167. See supra notes 33, 37.
168. See supra notes 33, 37.
169. See supra Part H.B (discussing commercialization in the charitable
sector).
170. See supra note 69.
171. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing the DELTA
court's analysis of 'trade or commerce").
172. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing section one of the
Sherman Act).
174. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing section two of the
Sherman Act).
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The courts have developed a careful analytical structure
under which alleged anticompetitive trade and commercial ac-
tivity are weighed against the legal mandate of the Sherman
Act.175 In applying that structure to nonprofits, the courts have
suggested that leniency should be factored into the equation. 76
Had the Ninth Circuit in DELTA looked beyond the threshold
of "trade or commerce," it would have recognized that blanketimmunity is not required to find that an activity does not vio-
late the antitrust laws. Rather, a charitable organization that
raises funds without restraining trade or monopolizing, at-
tempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize commerce
can do so lawfully under the Sherman Act.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not pause to consider a cru-
cial component of the surrounding circumstances: the nature of
fundraising in general and the nature of the allegedly anti-
competitive fumdraising in the particular case before it. When
charities raise funds they do so in exchange for the production
of charitable goods and services. "Whatever else it may be," 177
this is commerce in the most common usage of that word. "In
the modern world,"78 it cannot be denied that fundraising
plays an important part in commercial intercourse. Acknowl-
edging the commercial nature of charitable fundraising simply
opens the door for further analysis. 79 It is the particular man-
ner in which the Humane Society conducted its fundraising ac-
tivities that renders it lawful or unlawful under the Sherman
Act.
175. See supra note 41 (discussing analytical framework for evaluating an-
ticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act).
176. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that some courts
have been reluctant to condemn activities of nonprofits under the Sherman
Act).
177. See supra note 37 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 787 (1975)).
178. See supra note 38 (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788).
179. Such review is controlled by precedent and is unlikely to deluge the
charitable sector with the atrocities predicted by the DELTA court. See supra
note 90 and accompanying text (noting the Ninth Circuit's fear that applica-
tion of the antitrust laws to findraising would transform the law into an un-
mitigated "hunting license"); see also supra note 41 (discussing the various
levels of antitrust review).
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E. IMPLICATIONS OF FUNDRAISING As COMMERCIAL AcTIVITY
ABIDING BY THE LAW AND PROMOTING GOOD POLICY
At first glance, the argument that fundraising is trade or
commerce under the Sherman Act seems to be an uncharitable
reading of the law, subjecting goodwill organizations to unnec-
essary legal scrutiny. But there is another side to the issue.
Charities ultimately exist for those who directly consume, or
benefit from, charitable goods. Antitrust principles of effi-
ciency, minimum production cost, innovation, equal market ac-
cess and fair distribution 80 serve to promote the welfare of
those for whom the charitable marketplace exists. If the ulti-
mate beneficiaries of the charitable sector are our concern, it is
only just to enforce the laws so that charities respond to mar-
ket demands in the most cost-effective and efficient manner
possible. By prohibiting monopolies and other unlawful re-
straints in fundraising activities, the antitrust laws are an ef-
fective means to a charitable end.
Some courts and scholars believe that competition is mis-
placed in the charitable sector.181 Although the courts have
rejected that premise and applied the Sherman Act to commer-
cial conduct wherever it occurs, they have shown an inclination
to apply the antitrust laws more leniently when traditional
business entities are not involved.1 82 As such, the courts can
harmonize the language of the Sherman Act with charitable
activity rather than set the dangerous precedent of creating a
blanket exemption in an area where the Constitution or a per-
vasive federal statute is not threatened. Immunizing charita-
ble fundraising from antitrust liability invites disingenuous
organizations to take advantage of the law, consumers, and
beneficiaries in the charitable marketplace. Fidelity to the in-
tent of the 51st Congress, the text of the Sherman Act, and the
current state of the antitrust laws requires courts to recognize
commercial behavior, wherever it may occur, and to ensure
that it does not take place in an unlawful manner.
180. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 26.
182. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Note argues that charitable fundraising is "trade or
commerce" under the Sherman Act and, accordingly, that
charities must conform to the antitrust laws when they solicit
donations. Neither the Sherman Act nor judicial precedent ex-
empts charitable institutions from the purview of the federal
antitrust laws. A court is not free, therefore, to elevate a char-
ity above the law and turn a blind eye to its anticompetitive
fundraising activity. As the market for charitable donations
becomes more competitive, the charitable sector increasingly
mirrors and interacts with traditional business markets. This
means the courts must look beyond a charity's espoused none-
conomic goals to properly scrutinize alleged anticompetitive ac-
tivities. Whereas a nonprofit's conduct may ultimately be ex-
cused, it should not be by virtue of an exemption, but rather
because the law applied to the facts of the case does not war-
rant antitrust liability.
The DELTA court's across-the-board exemption of charita-
ble fundraising from antitrust accountability represents un-
warranted judicial activism and sets a dangerous precedent
whereby anticompetitive behavior may go unchecked in a
charitable guise, depriving consumers in the charitable mar-
ketplace of the benefits of competition and detracting from the
legitimacy of the charitable sector. Until and unless Congress
creates an explicit exemption under the Sherman Act for fund-
raising undertaken by charitable organizations, the antitrust
laws require that competition, consumer welfare, and efficiency
prevail in the charitable sector.
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